Exploring the Overlap Between Hunting Season and Increased Deer-Vehicle Collisions

Every fall, motorists are cautioned to remain alert while on roadways because of the significant rise in deer-vehicle collisions (DVC). According to the Insurance Information Institute, there is a dramatic increase in the movement of deer “during deer season” resulting in over 1.5 million DVCs annually and “more than $1 billion in auto damage.”  

State Farm Insurance confirms this phenomenon, noting that in 2015, “one out of 169 drivers will have a claim from hitting a deer, elk or moose”, and these odds “more than double” during the heavily hunted months of October, November and December.

by jcrader

The media and the hunting contingent routinely attribute this spike in roadway hazards to emboldened, testosterone-crazed bucks in hot pursuit of females. However, the majority of road-killed deer during breeding season are not antlered (i.e., are not mature males), dispelling the myth that horny deer are oblivious to roadway hazards. In fact, evidence suggests that to the contrary, it is terrified deer fleeing hunters who are the victims of increased DVCs in the fall.

One would reasonably expect that if erratic breeding season behavior was the true cause of increased DVCs in the fall, supporting studies and data would be abundant, especially given the frequency of these events, the cost in human and animal lives, property damage, etc., as well as the popularity of the claim itself. Although media claims and propaganda blaming deer for these tragic happenings are rampant, any critical studies to support the notion that rutting deer cause accidents in the fall are utterly lacking.

In fact, the one recent study uncovered by the Center for Wildlife Ethics addressing the tremendous uptick in autumn deer-vehicle collisions suggests a human-created cause. “Relationship of Autumn Hunting Season to the Frequency of Deer-Vehicle Collisions in Michigan,”[1] a 2006 study, suggests (and logic dictates), hunting is quite likely a contributing factor in the increased number of DVCs – most of which occur during the early morning and early evening hours – preferred hunting periods.

The study recommended further work examining the relationship between hunting season, rutting behavior and DVC frequency; yet ten years after its publication, it does not appear that any further work has been commissioned.

Why is that? Is it possible that the issue of DVCs is being avoided deliberately because of the negative ramifications such research may have on the hunting industry?

Remember, hunters typically use the tragic consequences of deer-vehicle collisions to bolster public support of recreational killing. They claim to provide a public service through white-tailed deer reductions – theoretically, reducing the number of DVCs.

The hunting contingent’s claims of public service are misleading. Deer populations are deliberately manipulated to record-setting levels for the sole purpose of providing an abundance of live targets for hunters to shoot. Larger populations lead to more competition for food, territories and mates, and ultimately, more roadway hazards.

by NIghthawk Publications

It is illogical to believe that hunters and their violent hobby are not a contributing factor to DVCs. The disruptive presence and predatory activities of hunters in deer habitat cause these nervous animals of prey to panic and bolt blindly across roadways while fleeing hunters, their vehicles, and of course, their lethal projectiles.

Any disruption in the deer’s environment and normal patterns of behavior is further compounded by hunters who hide in trees and douse themselves in estrous deer or dominant buck urine – substances that are sure to stimulate buck activity.

If the hunting community truly believed its own unsubstantiated assertions alleging that the sexual arousal of bucks in rut was to blame for these hazardous accidents, then the application of either of these substances make hunters culpable to some degree. Similarly, wildlife managers who deliberately manipulate deer populations to artificially high numbers for the benefit of local hunters should be held equally responsible.

[1] The Journal of Wildlife Management, 704(4): 1161-1164 (2006).

Making the Connection: Dove Hunting and Hunter Retention

            Sept. 1 marks the opening day of dove hunting season. Ironically, the dove is the same delicate bird that has historically been revered in America as a symbol of peace. 

            An Illinois Dove Hunter Assessment[1] estimates that more than 50 million shot shells (largely comprised of lead as 59% of hunters never use the ecologically preferred steel shot) are used to kill 12 to 18 million doves annually.

            How is this justified?

            Unlike the repeated mantras used to excuse the killing of other wildlife species, these birds are not deemed overpopulated nor do they cause damage to commercial farming. Rather, doves are extremely beneficial to the environment and aid farmers by feeding on weed seeds – an invaluable service that provides a natural alternative to the harmful chemical herbicides that routinely pollute our landscapes.

            These slight birds cannot be hunted for food in any practical sense. The average dove only weighs ~ 4.5 ounces and after all the gunshot is removed (highly recommended), any remaining portion is likely smaller than a chicken nugget.

            Doves typically do not flock together. To combat this solitary nature and encourage the congregation of large numbers of these birds at preferred shooting locations, acres of sunflowers are routinely planted, often times by the wildlife agencies. These lure plots serve to deliberately attract these birds to their death.

            For wildlife agencies though, doves represent more than simply live targets for hunters to shoot.

            Since the 1980s, there has been a steady decline in hunting participation.[2] The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources reported that for every 100 Wisconsin residents who give up hunting, only 53 new ones begin.[3]  In Michigan, the findings are even more dramatic with only 26 people replacing every 100 hunters lost.[4]          

            This significant drop in hunter participation places immense pressure on the agency’s operational budgets that rely heavily on the sale of licenses and matching federal funds. As such, wildlife managers have focused their attention on hunter recruitment, retention and growth, especially in younger markets.

            According to Families Afield, a program launched specifically to combat the decline in youth hunting participation, “the need for aggressive recruitment is urgent.”[5]

            The majority of hunters, 79.6%, start hunting between the ages of 6 and 15; thus, “quality hunting opportunities” such as special youth seasons and hunting at locations such as lure plots, help to incentivize children to start killing.

            Areas stocked with preferred game species (e.g., hand-reared birds lacking their natural aversion to the presence of humans) just prior to the arrival of armed children also serve to facilitate a “successful” kill.

            If senselessly killing sentient beings by the thousands and the complicity of our wildlife managers' in this abject violence is not objectionable enough, consider research that reflects an average wounding rate of 30 percent.[6]

                Downed birds are often crippled and continue to suffer until they starve or fall victim to predation. These birds are not included in a hunter's bag limit which results in even more birds being killed and maimed. Note too that many doves are still tending to their offspring during September, so additional undocumented birds are left to suffer. Since doves mate for life, when one is killed, the breeding pair is lost.

            Given the great lengths our wildlife managers extend themselves to perpetuate the killing of our wild natural resources, together with the callous disregard for suffering exhibited by those who consider the shooting of defenseless birds an acceptable recreational pastime, it is no wonder that the public's perception toward hunting continues to sour.

[1] Craig A. Miller, Assessment of Illinois Dove Hunter Satisfaction, Retention and Attitudes Toward Non-Toxic Shot, Dec. 2013, http://wwx.inhs.illinois.edu/files/1013/9638/2706/Assessment_of_Illinois_Dove_Hunter_Satisfaction_Retention_and_Attitudes_Toward_Steel_Shot.pdf (Last accessed Aug. 29, 2016).

[2] Jody W. Enck, George F. Mattfeld, and Daniel J. Decker, Retaining Likely Dropouts from Hunting: New York’s Apprentice Hunter Program, Trans. 61st No. Am. Wildl. And Natur. Resour. Conf., 358 (1996).

[3] J. Pritzl, Keeping connected, Wisconsin Natural Resources Magazine, April 2007. Retrieved May, 18, 2007, from http://www.wnrmag.com/stories/2007/apr07/kids.htm

[4] Silvertip Productions, Southwick Associates, et al., Revised youth hunting report, Families Afield. www.ussafoundation.org/document.doc?id=10 (Last accessed Jan. 29, 2016).

[5] Families Afield, “Revised Youth Hunting Report”, http://www.ussafoundation.org/document.doc?id=10 (Last accessed Aug. 30, 2016).

[6] Texas Parks and Wildlife, “Migratory Game Bird Wounding Loss,” https://tpwd.texas.gov/publications/pwdpubs/media/pwd_br_w7000_1690_06_11.pdf (Last accessed Aug. 30, 2016).

When a fake "emergency" becomes a real-life hazard

            Between 2004 and 2013, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) distorted the regulatory process for the purpose of converting public lands into private treasure troves for fur-trappers. Through the use of a temporary procedure—a so-called “emergency” rule—well-connected trappers were authorized to conceal dangerous lethal devices throughout state parks without so much as a cautionary warning to members of the public who visit these serene, cherished lands.

            As the name implies, an Emergency Rule (ER) is a regulatory action used in unusually hazardous situations that warrant immediate attention. According to Indiana law, the need for regulatory action is substantiated by a thorough investigation. When a long-term need is established, the ER process runs concurrently with the agency’s promulgation of a permanent rule.

            An agency relies on this parallel ER process when immediate action is necessary to put the pending permanent rule into operation during the interim. The ER is designed to be used infrequently and to serve as a temporary gap measure where public notice and comment is not discarded, only temporarily delayed due to the extraordinary circumstances.

            At least, that is how it is supposed to work.

            In 2004, IDNR, capitalizing on the disinterest of media and watchdog groups, enacted an ER to permit the trapping of beaver in Pokagon and Shakamak State Parks. By 2005, the ER targeted raccoons in 23 state parks. Additional species and properties, including state reservoir properties, were added in subsequent years.

            Lacking any semblance of meaningful agency oversight, the annual reissuance of this temporary regulatory scheme deliberately thwarted all public notice and input requirements. To date, IDNR as never promulgated a permanent rule to address this alleged “emergency.” No evidence was provided by the agency either through discovery in litigation that is currently pending or public access to records requests that would suggest IDNR (or anyone else) ever conducted a thorough investigation to support the need for an ER in any state park or reservoir property.

            IDNR’s deliberate abuse of the ER process begs the question: how can the mere presence of native wildlife on vast undeveloped swaths of wooded parkland be construed as an unusual hazard? And, if the alleged nuisance wildlife problems were severe enough to constitute an emergency, these concerns would be well-documented, right?

            According to IDNR’s communication director, the raccoon “emergency” was supported by a 1988 raccoon roundworm study, the 1987 Indiana Prairie Farmer Report, the 1993 AVMA Panel on Euthanasia Report, and other irrelevant documents that contained the word “raccoon”. While this conglomeration of random, outdated materials could conceivably be of interest from an historical wildlife zoonotic disease perspective, it is of no value for demonstrating the existence of an immediate hazard on any Indiana public lands between 2004 and 2013.

            When pressed, the agency claimed that a handful of camper complaints about nuisance raccoons generated during the summer months at various state parks triggered the need for the ERs. How these random complaints, spread over the course of several years, could conceivably be used to justify the need for trapping and killing raccoons in other parks hundreds of miles away is anyone’s guess.

            Notably, the ERs enacted to address this alleged emergency limited all trapping activities to the regulated trapping season and mandated that any trappers targeting nuisance situations outside of the legal trapping season must “possess a nuisance wild animal control permit”.

            If the ERs were truly meant to address nuisance wildlife complaints, there would be no need for trappers to obtain another permit. And, if camper complaints legitimately rose to the level of an emergency, why would trappers be required to wait until winter – 6+ months later – to target the offending animal(s)? 

            Contrary to IDNR’s oft-repeated rhetoric, this regulatory scheme was deliberately designed to financially benefit fur trappers. The ERs’ explicit limitations ensured that animals would only be killed during the winter months when animal pelts are plush and marketable. The ERs explicit language actually served to discourage trappers from responding to camper complaints or legitimate nuisance situations during the peak camping season.

            Blaming “nuisance” wildlife was an advertent public relations’ tactic that allowed the agency to present the killing of wildlife on public lands as a necessary evil. Painting these animals as a human health threat served to disguise the fact that the annual trapping and killing of wildlife was being conducted for recreation and profit.

            An internal IDNR memorandum clearly supports this position. The memo cautioned property managers about setting trapping conditions in each park and stressed the importance of confidentiality: “this matter should not “become a public media issue…for obvious reasons.” IDNR, so committed to secrecy, refused to inform the public about these hidden lethal devices and then excused this blatant recklessness by claiming that publicizing the program may result in traps being stolen.

            IDNR fabricated an emergency situation to financially reward its friends in the fur trapping industry. The overwhelming irony in this situation is that by doing so, the agency, as public land custodians, deliberately created an unusual hazard that foreseeably jeopardized the same constituency it is entrusted and obligated to protect. And then it exhibited this reckless disregard for both public safety and sound public policy for more than 9 years.